One of history’s great ironies is that the United States, in invading Iraq in 2003 to remove a government it considered hostile, created the conditions for the dramatic expansion of influence by the country it considered its most dangerous adversary in the region. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who had fought an eight-year war against Iran, removed the most significant check on Iranian regional expansion and opened the door for Tehran to rebuild deep relationships with Iraq’s Shia majority population.
Khamenei understood the opportunity and moved systematically to exploit it. Iranian-backed militias became deeply embedded in Iraqi politics and security. Religious and cultural ties between Iranian and Iraqi Shia communities were strengthened and institutionalized. Political figures with close ties to Tehran gained significant influence in Baghdad. Iraq, once Iran’s most dangerous enemy, became an important strategic asset.
This success informed the broader strategy of building influence through non-state actors — the approach that produced Hezbollah in Lebanon, sustained Hamas in Gaza, and created networks of allied forces across the region. Each of these projects required resources, patience, and willingness to accept setbacks. Khamenei provided all three over decades of consistent strategic direction.
The near-collapse of that network, driven primarily by Israel’s military campaigns, represents the failure of the strategy’s most recent phase rather than the strategy’s entire legacy. Iran’s influence in Iraq, though diminished, remains significant. The relationships built over two decades do not disappear with a single Supreme Leader.
But the death of the man who built the strategy leaves the network without its central strategic intelligence. Whether his successor will have the vision, the resources, and the freedom of action to rebuild what has been lost — or will choose a fundamentally different approach — is a question with profound implications for the entire region.