Granting China’s request for the U.S. to “oppose” Taiwanese independence would create a significant “moral hazard”—a situation where one party is encouraged to take greater risks because another party will bear the cost. In this case, a U.S. concession could inadvertently encourage more aggressive behavior from Beijing by signaling a reduced commitment to Taiwan’s defense.
By shifting its language from the neutral “do not support” to the active “oppose,” the United States would be sending a powerful message that it has downgraded the political importance of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Hardliners within the Chinese military and government could interpret this as a weakening of American resolve, leading them to believe that the potential costs of a military adventure against Taiwan have been significantly lowered.
This creates the moral hazard: China might feel emboldened to engage in riskier military provocations—such as large-scale drills, airspace violations, or even a blockade—under the assumption that the U.S. has already politically distanced itself from the island and would be less likely to intervene forcefully.
The concept is similar to how a person with excellent insurance might drive more recklessly. In this geopolitical scenario, a U.S. policy shift would act as a form of “insurance” for Beijing’s risk-taking, making a future conflict more, not less, likely. The United States would bear the cost of this increased aggression, either by being forced into a conflict it sought to avoid or by suffering a massive blow to its credibility if it failed to act.
This is the central paradox of the potential concession. While it might be intended as a move to de-escalate tensions and secure a deal, it could have the opposite effect by creating a moral hazard that makes Chinese aggression a more attractive and seemingly less costly option.